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Abstract—This work presents a novel method to generate
secret keys shared between a legitimate node pair (Alice and
Bob) to safeguard the communication between them from an
unauthorized node (Eve). To this end, we exploit the reciprocal
carrier frequency offset (CFO) between the legitimate node pair to
extract common randomness out of it to generate shared secret
keys. The proposed key generation algorithm involves standard
steps: the legitimate nodes exchange binary phase-shift keying
(BPSK) signals to perform blind CFO estimation on the received
signals, and do equi-probable quantization of the noisy CFO
estimates followed by information reconciliation–to distil a shared
secret key. Furthermore, guided by the Allan deviation curve, we
distinguish between the two frequency-stability regimes—when
the randomly time-varying CFO process i) has memory, ii) is
memoryless; thereafter, we compute the key generation rate for
both regimes. Simulation results show that the key disagreement
rate decreases exponentially with increase in the signal to noise
ratio of the link between Alice and Bob. Additionally, the decipher
probability of Eve decreases as soon as either of the two links
observed by the Eve becomes more degraded compared to the
link between Alice and Bob.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security has its roots in 1950’s when Shannon
argued that perfect secrecy is possible provided that the
entropy of the secret key is greater than the entropy of the to-
be transmitted message [1]. Later on, Wyner, in his influential
work introduced the notion of Gaussian wiretap channel to
compute the so-called secrecy capacity in additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) channels [2]. Csiszar [3] then extended
the notion of secrecy capacity to the wireless fading channels.
Maurer [4] was first to suggest to extract shared secret keys
from a common source of randomness. Nevertheless, until last
decade, the world had been accustomed to using higher-layer
cryptographic protocols for authentication/security purposes.
More recently, there is a growing interest in designing al-
gorithms at the physical layer so as to complement/improve
the existing security mechanisms, see, e.g., [5],[6] for a quick
overview of recent development in the field.
In the literature on physical layer security, two popular
models exist: i) Wyner’s wiretap model, and ii) Basic source
model. Wyner’s wiretap model assumes that eavesdropper is
using a degraded version of the main channel, and utilizes
channel coding to approach the secrecy capacity. Having said
this, much work has been done to design channel coding
schemes which meet the absolute limits of secrecy capacity
[7]. On the other hand, under the Basic source model, two
legitimate nodes obtain multiple correlated observations from a
shared random source. Both nodes then quantize their observa-
tions, do the information reconciliation [8] (to eradicate the bit
mismatch at both ends) followed by privacy amplification [9]
(to hash out the bits revealed during information reconciliation
phase) to distil a shared secret key.
For the Basic source model, researchers have exploited the
random and reciprocal nature of wireless medium in single-
antenna and multiple-antenna settings to generate shared se-
cret keys [10], [11]. Additionally, the feasibility of using
the relays/friendly jammers to design high performance key
generation algorithms is reported in [12], [13].
Apart from the medium, physical characteristics of the
underlying device hardware can also be used for security,
e.g., integrated circuits [14], oscillators [15–18], antennas [19],
non-reciprocal hardware [20] etc. In this paper, we exploit
reciprocal carrier frequency offset (CFO) between a node pair
to generate secret keys shared between that node pair. To the
best of authors’ knowledge, there has been no work on this
expect [15–17], which all use the CFO for authentication.
The main contributions of this paper are two-fold: i) a novel
algorithm which constructs shared secret keys from the noisy
CFO estimates ii) key generation rate of the CFO process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model and the CFO models. The
proposed, CFO based method for secret key generation is
presented in Section III. Section IV studies the key generation
rate of the CFO process. Section V provides some simulation
results. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & CFO BACKGROUND
A. System Model
The system model consists of three nodes, Alice, Bob and
Eve. As shown in Fig. 1, Alice and Bob make a legitimate node
pair who intend to establish a secure wireless communication
link in order to exchange confidential messages. Eve is a ma-
licious node who passively eavesdrops in order to decipher the
shared secret key being used by Alice and Bob. The legitimate
node pair operates in half-duplex/time-division duplex (TDD)
mode with T seconds long time-slots. Specifically, in order to
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measure the CFO to learn a shared secret key, Alice and Bob
exchange binary phase shift keying (BPSK)-modulated packets
to each other. Finally, the center frequency of the channel is
ωc rad/sec.
Fig. 1. System model.
B. CFO is Reciprocal
CFO is a measure of the speed of oscillations of a device’s
oscillator relative to that of another device. CFO arises due to
manufacturing tolerance of oscillators; and may drift over time
due to environmental/operating conditions. CFO is reciprocal:
let ωAB = ωA −ωB (rad/sec) be the CFO between ”Alice and
Bob”, then reciprocity implies that ωAB = −ωBA. Therefore,
the mutual CFO ωAB can indeed be exploited by the legitimate
node pair (Alice and Bob) to generate shared secret keys every
once in a while. Fig. 2 plots the two CFO’s (fAB = ωAB/2pi1
and −fBA = −ωBA/2pi) against time. To obtain Fig. 2,
an experiment was set up whereby two GNU Radio/USRP
based software-defined radios (SDR) exchanged unmodulated
tones/sinusoids with each other in frequency-division duplex
(FDD) fashion to measure the (time-varying) CFO in both
directions. Fig. 2 verifies that the CFO is indeed reciprocal.
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Fig. 2. Experimental validation: CFO between a node pair is reciprocal.
C. CFO Models
We now introduce the three fundamental models which
govern the random, time-varying nature of the CFO.
Model M1: CFO is time-invariant. Under this model, the
CFO ωAB is treated as a random variable with distribution
1We use the notation ω (rad/sec) and f (Hz) in interchangeable manner
throughout the rest of the paper.
U(−2pi∆,2pi∆) where ∆ could be derived from the parts-per-
million (ppm) specs of the oscillators under consideration. This
work considers the homogeneous case, i.e., when all the three
nodes (Alice, Bob, Eve) of the considered system model use
oscillators with same stability (ppm) specification. Let each of
the three oscillators have an accuracy of x ppm, then ∆ = fc×x
Hz (fc is the center frequency in MHz).
The construction of the remainig two models, model M2
and model M3 is based upon the so-called Allan Deviation2.
So, Allan deviation first.
Allan deviation. Fig. 3 shows a typical plot of the Allan
deviation σy(τ) against the observation interval τ . Fig. 3
indicates that there are two frequency-stability regions for the
oscillators. In the short-term stability region (which lasts from
few seconds to few minutes), white frequency noise dominates,
while in the long-term stability region, random walk frequency
noise dominates.
Fig. 3. Allan deviation σy(τ) as a function of the observation interval τ .
Model M2: CFO is time-varying and memory-full. Model
M2 represents the long-term stability region of the Allan
deviation curve. Here, aging/temperature effects cause the
CFO to undertake a random walk over time [21], [22]:
Model M2a: ωAB(k + 1) = ωAB(k) + nAB(k) (1)
where nAB(k) ∼ N(0, σ2) is the random walk frequency
noise. Let tk − tk−1 = T be the duration of a time-slot. Then,
σ2 = ω2cq22T where q22 = 5.51 × 10−18 for USRP N200 radios
[23]. Re-arranging Eq. (1), we have:
Model M2b: nAB(k) = ωAB(k + 1) − ωAB(k) (2)
Note that the original stochastic process {ωAB}k of Eq. (1),
Model M2a, is non-stationary auto-regressive moving average
(ARMA) process, while the stochastic process {nAB}k of Eq.
(2), Model M2b, is stationary with independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) elements.
Model M3: CFO is time-varying and memoryless. Model
M3 represents the short-term stability region of the Allan
deviation curve. Here, the CFO {ωAB}k is a memoryless
random process. That is, the CFO stays constant for the slot
duration T ; moreover, the CFO realizations across the slots
2Allan deviation is a well-known measure of frequency-stability of the
oscillators [21], [22].
are i.i.d U(−2pi∆,2pi∆). This model resembles closely the
well-acclaimed block-fading model for wireless channels.
At this point, some comments about the three CFO models
are in order. Model M1, model M3 represent extreme/limiting
cases whereby the CFO does not change at all, change in-
dependently during every time-slot, respectively. Furthermore,
Model M1 represents an ideal oscillator (closest to which are
the atomic clocks). On the other hand, all the commodity
oscillators follow the Allan deviation curve which implies that
they follow either model M2, or, model M3, depending upon
the total time of their operation. Finally, we note that model
M1 provides only 1 secret key during the life-time of an (ideal)
oscillator; therefore, the rest of this paper will focus on model
M2 and model M3 (and thus, commodity oscillators) only.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
Due to two-way communication between Alice and Bob,
four CFOs are of interest: ωAB , ωBA, ωAE , ωBE (see Fig.
1). Appendix A describes a blind method for CFO estima-
tion from BPSK-modulated data. Having obtained the noisy
CFO estimates ωˆAB(k) = ωAB(k) + νAB(k) and ωˆBA(k) =
ωBA(k) + νBA(k), Alice and Bob utilize them to generate
secret keys. νAB(k) ∼ N(0, σ2AB) (νBA(k) ∼ N(0, σ2BA))
is the estimation error at Alice (Bob). Specifically, with the
CFO measurements in hand, the legitimate nodes need to do
information reconciliation followed by privacy amplification.
For information reconciliation, both nodes utilize linear block
codes to exchange syndrome to eradicate the bit mismatch3.
For privacy amplification, universal hash functions could be
used to hash out the information revealed.
The essential steps of the proposed method are formally
summarized below. Alice and Bob:
1) exchange BPSK signals to perform blind CFO estimation
on the received signals to get ωˆBA, ωˆAB , respectively.
2) quantize their individual CFO estimates using equi-
probable/uniform quantization to get KA and KB , respec-
tively. KA (KB) is length-n binary key at Alice (Bob).
3) do information reconciliation using linear block codes to
construct reconciled keys KA and KB , respectively.
Note that uniform quantization in step 2 results in some
entropy loss, while information reconciliation in step 3 reveals
some information as well (due to public discussion). Thus,
both steps 2,3 reduce the secret bit rate (SBR) to some extent.
Remark 1. Since model M2 is an ARMA process, both
Alice and Bob implement a linear Kalman filter (LKF) (after
step 1 and before step 2) to effectively track the drifting
CFOs. Each of the two LKFs is fed by the noisy CFO
estimate (outputted by the blind estimation method) and yields
the filtered CFO estimate. Note that the LKF is the best
linear unbiased estimator of the CFO. Therefore, once LKF
is converged, each legitimate node utilizes its filtered estimate
3Note that when the public discussion for information reconciliation is not
feasible, each of the legitimate nodes (Alice and Bob) could do majority
decision decoding at its end for authentication. That is, Bob authenticates
Alice if the received secret key and the local key have at most p (0 < p < n)
mismatches, where n is the length of the shared secret key.
to implement step 2 and step 3. More details on using the LKF
to track the drifting CFOs could be found in [16],[23].
IV. KEY GENERATION RATE OF THE CFO PROCESS
A. Differential Entropy Rates
The differential entropy rate of model M2b is: hM2b =
1
2
log2(2pieω2cq22T ) bits/realization, thanks to {nAB}k being
a stationary process with i.i.d. elements, see Eq. (2). The
differential entropy rate of model M3 is: hM3 = log2(4pi∆)
bits/realization. Note that hM3 is non-negative when ∆ ≥ 14pi =
0.0796 Hz which is satisfied easily by the low to medium-end
temperature/voltage-controlled oscillators (which culminate in
a CFO on the order of hundreds of Hz when tuned to a
center frequency of few hundreds of MHz). Also, hM2b is
non-negative when ω2cT ≥ 12pieq22 = 1.06× 1016 (this inequality
is satisfied, say, with T = 1 ms, for fc = ωc2pi ≥ 1.032pi GHz).
B. Key Generation Rate
The key generation rate (KGR) of the proposed method
depends on the Auto-correlation function (ACF) of the CFO
process {fAB}k. Specifically, with 1 ≤ p ≤ q, let fAB(p) and
fAB(q) represent the CFO at time p and q, respectively. Then,
the ACF for model M2a (a first-order ARMA process) is:
ACFM2a(p, q) = √pq . It is also straightforward to see that the
ACF for model M2b (a stationary process with i.i.d. elements)
is: ACFM2b(p, q) = δ(p − q) where δ(p − q) is the Dirac
delta function; δ(p − q) is 1 for p = q, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, the ACF for model M3 is: ACFM3(p, q) = δ(p−q).
For model M2a, a new realization of the CFO process occurs
when ACFM2a ≤ η where η > 0 is a small threshold. Let
TM2a denote the time to obtain a new realization for model
M2a. Then, KGRM2a ≤ hM2aTM2a bits/sec. For model M2b and
model M3, a new realization of the CFO process occurs
every T seconds. Therefore, or, KGRM2b ≤ hM2bT bits/sec, and
KGRM3 ≤ hM3T bits/sec.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we assess the performance of the proposed
CFO based secret key generation method by investigating the
following metrics: auto-correlation function, key generation
rate, key disagreement rate, and decipher probability of Eve.
Fig. 4 (a) plots the ACF for the models M2a, and M3.
Note that the ACF for model M2a depends explicitly on the
absolute time instants p and q. Thus, the ACF of model M2a
does not decay unless p and q are quite far apart. Therefore,
assuming that fAB(p) corresponds to M -th sample for i-th
secret key, and fAB(q) corresponds to first sample for (i+1)-
th secret key, one can see that the KGR for model M2a decays
exponentially over time. For illustration, assume that T = 50
ms and required ACFM2 < η = 0.3. Then, Fig. 4 (b) shows that
the time between generation of two successive keys increases
exponentially for model M2a. In other words, due to non-
stationary nature of model M2a, the CFO could provide only
few (∼ 10) secret keys within useful operating time. On the
other hand, model M3 could provide 1 secret key every T
seconds. In other words, KGR of model M3 is 1
T
keys/sec.
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Fig. 4. (a) ACF of the CFO for models M2a, M3, (b) time between
generation of two successive keys for models M2a, M3.
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Fig. 5. Key disagreement rate vs. SNR.
Fig. 5 plots the average key disagreement rate (KDR)–a
measure of the CFO reciprocity–against the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) for models M2a, and M3. The average KDR is
defined as: average number of bits mismatched between the
(length-n) keys of Alice and Bob. That is, average KDR is
computed as ∑N #(KA≠KB)n , or, ∑N #(KA≠KB)n , depending
upon the stage, i.e., before or after information reconciliation.
The #(A ≠ B) operator outputs the number of bits mis-
matched between two length-n sequences A and B. Thus, for
Monte-Carlo simulations, we set N = 1e5, use equi-probable
quantization with 3 quantization levels, and utilize Hamming(7,4) code for information reconciliation. Fig. 5 reveals that
the average KDR decreases exponentially fast with increase in
SNR, for both models M2a, M3. Additionally, for any given
SNR, the information reconciliation helps reduce the KDR
(though the gap diminishes with increase in SNR), as expected.
Fig. 6 plots the average decipher probability of Eve (DPE)
as a heat map for a range of pathloss values experienced
by the two links (Alice to Eve, and, Bob to Eve) seen by
Eve. The average DPE is defined as: average number of bits
matched between the (length-n) key of Eve and the reconciled
keys of Alice and Bob. That is, average DPE is computed
as: 1
2
[∑N #(KE=KA)n +∑N #(KE=KB)n ] where KE is the key
at Eve. KE was constructed by invoking the step 2 of the
proposed method on ωˆAE − ωˆBE (the Eve’s belief about
the shared secret key). One could see that the average DPE
decreases from 0.9 to 0.5 as soon as either of the two links
observed by the Eve becomes more degraded compared to the
link between Alice and Bob.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed to utilize the reciprocal CFO to generate
shared secret keys between a legitimate node pair in the
presence of a malicious node. Simulation result have shown
that the KDR decreases exponentially with increase in the SNR
of the link between Alice and Bob. Furthermore, the average
DPE decreases as soon as either of the two links observed by
the Eve becomes more degraded compared to the link between
Alice and Bob. We have also computed the KGR of the CFO
process for the two frequency-stability regimes of oscillators.
Some comments about the proposed method are in order.
CFO based key generation is appealing because CFO estima-
tion is easily carried out, and already a mandatory operation
for the modern cellular/WiFi receivers. Also, the average DPE
could approach to zero when the legitimate node pair em-
ploys multiple-antenna/beamforming techniques to ensure that
minimum power is radiated in unintended directions. Finally,
high frequency bands such as milli-meter wave/60 GHz band
and terahertz band could benefit from the proposed method
because the KGR of the proposed method is proportional to the
center frequency of operation. In short, the proposed method
could act as first line of defense against the malicious nodes
who are either facing degraded/bad channels, or, don’t have
the computational resources for sophisticated, real-time signal
processing. In near future, we aim to prototype the proposed
algorithm on GNU radio/USRP based SDR platform.
APPENDIX A
BLIND CFO ESTIMATION FROM BPSK WAVEFORM
The BPSK baseband waveform at transmitter is: x(t) =∑k akp(t−kT ) where ak ∈ {1,−1}, p(t) is the pulse shape and
T is symbol duration. Then, the signal received at the receiver
is: y(t) = x(t) exp(j2pi∆ft). To estimate the CFO ∆f , one
needs to perform a series of operations on y(t). Specifically,
y2(t) = {x(t) exp(j2pi∆ft)}2= x2(t) exp(j4pi∆ft)= {∑
k
akp(t − kT )}2 exp(j4pi∆ft)
= {∑
k
p2(t − kT )} exp(j4pi∆ft)
Let f(t) = ∑k p2(t − kT ). Then one can write:
f(t) = a0
2
+ ∞∑
n=1(an cos 2npitT + bn sin 2npitT ) (3)
where a0, an and bn are the Fourier series coefficients given
as: a0 = 2T ∫ T0 f(t)dt, an = 2T ∫ T0 f(t) cos( 2npitT )dt, and bn =
2
T ∫ T0 f(t) sin( 2npitT )dt. Then,
y2(t) = f(t) exp(j4pi∆ft)= {a0
2
+ ∞∑
n=1(an cos 2npitT + bn sin 2npitT )} exp(j4pi∆ft)
Let 1
T
= Fsym, the symbol rate. Let us now write the real and
imaginary parts of y2(t) separately:
R(y2(t)) = a0
2
cos(4pi∆ft)
+ ∞∑
n=1(an cos(2pinFsymt) cos(4pi∆ft)+ bn sin(2pinFsymt) cos(4pi∆ft))
(4)
I(y2(t)) = a0
2
sin(4pi∆ft)
+ ∞∑
n=1(an cos(2pinFsymt) sin(4pi∆ft)+ bn sin(2pinFsymt) sin(4pi∆ft))
(5)
Passing the complex-valued signal y2(t) of Eqs. (4), (5)
through a low-pass filter with cut-off frequency ωc in the range
4pi∆f << ωc << 2piFsym, we get:
z(t) = a0
2
exp(j4pi∆ft) (6)
Finally, we take the fast Fourier transform (FFT) of z(t), find
the frequency 2̂∆f corresponding to the peak value, and divide
it by 2 which gives us the CFO estimate.
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